USA v. Woody Grier by unknown
2009 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-28-2009 
USA v. Woody Grier 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Woody Grier" (2009). 2009 Decisions. 370. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/370 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2009 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 08-4612
            
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
WOODY GRIER,
                            Appellant
            
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. No. 1-07-cr-00209-001)
District Judge:  Hon. Sylvia H. Rambo
            
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 26, 2009
Before:  SLOVITER, FUENTES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: October 28, 2009)
            
OPINION
            
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C.1
§ 3231 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18
U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
 Appellant Woody Grier pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to
distribute and distribution of five grams or more of cocaine base and was sentenced to
235 months imprisonment.  He appeals two of the District Court’s rulings under the
Sentencing Guidelines and the reasonableness of his ultimate sentence.   1
I.
In 2006, Grier sold cocaine base to several confidential informants in Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania.  Thereafter, state officers obtained a search warrant and discovered cocaine
base in a residence that Grier used to distribute drugs.  Grier admitted to police at that
time that he possessed the cocaine with the intent to distribute it.  
Grier was subsequently indicted for one count of possession with intent to
distribute five grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).  After his
arrest and initial appearance, Grier was released pending a detention hearing to be held
four days later.  However, he failed to appear at that hearing.  Grier was subsequently
apprehended and ordered detained pending trial.  He was then placed in state prison based
on a warrant for failure to pay child support, but the prison mistakenly released him after
two days.
Following his mistaken release, Grier remained outside custody for over eight
 Grier’s sentence was calculated under the 2007 version of2
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual. 
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months.  He was finally arrested during a traffic stop in which he provided a false name
and date of birth and was again found in possession of cocaine base.  Grier then entered
into a plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to the drug charge in exchange
for, as relevant here, the government’s agreement to recommend a downward departure
under the Sentencing Guidelines for acceptance of responsibility.  Grier subsequently
entered his guilty plea in the District Court. 
The Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), which
the District Court adopted without change at Grier’s sentencing hearing.   Grier faced a2
base offense level of 24 on the drug offense, and the PSR recommended a two-level
enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 based on Grier’s failure to
report to his detention hearing and his eight months as a fugitive following his mistaken
release from state prison.  In addition, the PSR determined that Grier was a career
offender, and therefore he faced an offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of
VI under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.  Further, the PSR determined that a downward departure for
acceptance of responsibility was not warranted in light of Grier’s obstruction of justice.  
Grier challenged the obstruction of justice enhancement and the rejection of the
acceptance of responsibility departure, but the District Court rejected those challenges in
light of Grier’s failure to report to his detention hearing and his conduct following his
4mistaken release from state prison, including his use of a false identity when arrested and
possession of cocaine.  The government did move for a downward departure of one level
under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 based on Grier’s substantial assistance, and the Court granted
that departure.  Thus, Grier ultimately faced a Guidelines range of 235 to 293 months
imprisonment.
The District Court then heard argument from the parties regarding an appropriate
sentence.  As relevant here, Grier argued for a downward variance because he provided
care for his mother, who suffers from cancer, and because his conduct following the plea
agreement demonstrated acceptance of responsibility. 
As noted above, the District Court sentenced Grier to 235 months imprisonment,
the bottom of the Guidelines range.  It concluded that this sentence was appropriate in
light of Grier’s substantial criminal history (six adult convictions, five of which related to
drugs), including Grier’s continued involvement in drugs following his arrest for the
instant offense, and the need to deter Grier from committing future crimes.  It also
rejected Grier’s request for a downward variance so that he could provide care for his
mother.  The judge stated that other family members were available to aid his mother and,
in any case, the only sentence that would allow Grier to render such aid would be
probation, which the court concluded was inappropriate here. 
II.
On appeal, Grier first challenges the District Court’s rulings under the Sentencing
5Guidelines regarding the obstruction of justice enhancement and the departure for
acceptance of responsibility.  We review these decisions for clear error.  See United States
v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).
As to the obstruction of justice enhancement, we note initially that, in light of his
status as a career offender (which Grier does not challenge), the obstruction of justice
enhancement had no direct effect on his ultimate advisory Guidelines sentence under
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.  Further, under the circumstances of this case, the District Court did
not commit clear error in concluding that Grier willfully obstructed justice.  The
Guidelines commentary expressly states that “escaping . . . from custody before trial” and
“willfully failing to appear, as ordered, for a judicial proceeding” constitute obstruction. 
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(e).  After Grier was released following his initial appearance,
he failed to appear as ordered at his detention hearing four days later.  Grier points to no
evidence suggesting that this failure to appear was due to a mistake or inadvertence. 
Additionally, following his accidental release from state prison, Grier disappeared for
eight months, despite his awareness of the pending federal drug charge.  When he was
finally arrested, he was found in possession of additional drugs and attempted to avoid
detection by providing the police with a false identity.
The District Court also did not commit clear error in rejecting a downward
departure for acceptance of responsibility.  The Guidelines commentary states that where,
as here, the defendant engages in conduct resulting in an enhancement for obstruction of
6justice, such conduct “ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted
responsibility for his criminal conduct.”  U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.4.  Here, Grier points to
no extraordinary circumstances supporting a contrary conclusion.
Further, in United States v. Boettger, 316 F.3d 816, 817 (8th Cir. 2003), the court
of appeals upheld a denial of a departure for acceptance of responsibility in a starkly
similar case.  There, the defendant was released from custody pending trial on drug
charges but he fled, and after he was subsequently arrested, he was inadvertently released
from prison and again attempted to flee; all the while, the defendant continued his drug
use.  Id.  The court upheld the denial of a departure because the defendant’s “conduct was
inconsistent with an acceptance of responsibility.”  Id.  So too were Grier’s actions.
Finally, Grier argues that his ultimate sentence was unreasonable because it
overstated the seriousness of his criminal history.  We review the reasonableness of a
sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard.  See United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d
558, 566-67 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  Here, the sentence imposed was procedurally and
substantively reasonable.  The Court correctly calculated the Guidelines range, properly
ruled on the requested departures under the Guidelines, and heard argument from the
parties regarding an appropriate sentence.  Moreover, it did not abuse its discretion in
imposing a sentence of 235 months given Grier’s extensive criminal history and conduct
following his initial arrest on the instant offense.
7III.
For the above-stated reasons, we will affirm the judgment and sentence.
